Abstract. Historically, multivariate public key cryptography has been less than successful at offering encryption schemes which are both secure and efficient. At PQCRYPTO '13 in Limoges, Tao, Diene, Tang, and Ding introduced a promising new multivariate encryption algorithm based on a fundamentally new idea: hiding the structure of a large matrix algebra over a finite field. We present an attack based on subspace differential invariants inherent to this methodology. The attack is a structural key recovery attack which is asymptotically optimal among all known attacks (including algebraic attacks) on the original scheme and its generalizations.
Introduction
In the mid 1990s, Peter Shor developed efficient algorithms for factoring and computing discrete logarithms with quantum computers [1] . Since that time, the state-of-the-art of quantum computing has changed significantly, indicating that large scale quantum computing may become an eventual reality. In the years since Shor's discovery, there has emerged a rapidly growing community dedicated to the task of constructing algorithms resistant to cryptanalysis with quantum computers.
Multivariate Public Key Cryptography(MPKC) is one among a few serious candidates to have risen to prominence as post-quantum options. The appeal of MPKC is due to several factors. The fundamental problem of solving a system of quadratic equations is known to be NP-hard, and so in the worst case, solving a system of generic quadratic equations is unfeasible for a classical computer; neither is there any indication that the task is easier in the quantum computing paradigm. Furthermore, experience indicates that this problem is hard even in the average case; thus multivariate cryptosystems at least have a chance of being difficult to break. Secondly, multivariate cryptosystems are often very efficient, see [2] [3] [4] . Finally, such cryptosystems can be very amenable to the user demands, with multiple parameters hidden within the system which can be altered by the user to achieve different performance goals.
Though MPKC has a turbulent history with many schemes failing against only a few attack techniques, there are still some entirely usable and trustworthy quantum-resistant multivariate signature schemes. Specifically, UOV [5] , , and HFEv- [7] are noteworthy in this regard. Moreover, some of these schemes have optimizations which have strong theoretical support or have stood unbroken in the literature for some time. Specifically, UOV has a cyclic variant [8] which reduces the key size dramatically, and QUARTZ, an HFEv-scheme, has had its parameters tweaked [9] due to greater confidence in the complexity of algebraically solving the underlying system of equations [10] .
Where MPKC has failed more directly has been encryption. There is a striking lack of reliable multivariate encryption schemes in the literature. Many attempts, see [11, 12] for example, have been shown to be weak based on rank or differential weaknesses. The most recent and promising attempt, by Tao et al., see [13] , uses a fundamentally new structure for the derivation of an encryption system. Specifically, the scheme masks matrix multiplication to generate a system of structured quadratic equations.
In this article, we present a structural attack which is the asymptotically optimal attack on this matrix encryption scheme, having a complexity on the order of q s+4 , where s is the dimension of the matrices in the scheme. This technique uses a differential invariant property of the core map to perform a key recovery attack. We reevaluate some of the security analysis from the original ABC specification and conclude that this attack is asymptotically optimal among structural attacks. In fact, the attack uses a property which uniquely distinguishes the isomorphism class of the core map from that of a random collection of formulae. This attack asymptotically defeats algebraic attacks as well, though falling short of the benchmark established by generic algebraic attacks for the original parameters. This result supports the security claims of the designers (modulo decryption failure).
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the structure of the original ABC encryption scheme. The following section reviews some of the previous cryptanalyses of the scheme, and clarifies some of the previous attacks. In the subsequent section, we recall differential invariants. The differential invariant structure of the ABC scheme is then presented and the effect of this structure on minrank calculations is derived. In the following section, the complexity of the full attack is calculated and compared to the complexity of other valid structural attacks. Finally, we review these results and discuss the implications for the practical security of the ABC scheme.
The ABC Matrix Encryption Scheme
In [13] , Tao et al. introduce the ABC Matrix encryption scheme. For the simplicity of the exposition, we will analyze the original scheme noting that all results carry over exactly as stated to the updated version, see [14] .
